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—  Sympos ium — 
Executive Discretion and the 
Administrative State 
Introduction 
B. Jessie Hill† 
It would be no exaggeration to say that struggles over executive 
discretion are as old as the executive itself. Yet, it is also a favorite 
canard of pundits and talking heads on both sides of the political 
spectrum to claim that recent administrations have engaged in power-
grabbing that is both unprecedented and in excess of constitutional 
limits.1 Rarely are such claims examined in careful and studious detail, 
as the authors of this Symposium have done.  
Controversies over the Obama Administration’s actions (or, in 
some cases, declared inaction) on immigration, the Affordable Care Act, 
marijuana, and recess appointments have reminded us that executive 
discretion and the potential for executive overreaching extend beyond 
the international affairs and national security arenas. Recently, tension 
between Congress and the President became particularly visible when 
a federal district court preliminarily enjoined President Obama’s 
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents.”2 Though only a preliminary ruling, the decision charged 
that the administration’s newly announced policy not to deport a 
particular category of deportable immigrants, issued in the face of 
congressional inaction on immigration reform, evinced “complete 
abdication” of executive responsibility, “thwart[ing]” the will of 
 
† Judge Ben C. Green Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty 
Development and Research, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law.  
1. See, e.g., Bill O’Reilly, Bill O’Reilly: Is President Obama Misusing His 
Power? Talking Points (July 21, 2014), available at http://www.fox 
news.com/transcript/2014/07/22/bill-oreilly-president-obama-misusing-
his-power/ (suggesting that President Obama has abused the power of his 
office in a way that is different from prior presidents’ abuses); Senator 
Says Bush Is Acting Like “King George,” ABC News (Dec. 18, 2005), 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/07/22/bill 
-oreilly-president-obama-misusing-his-power/ (quoting former Sen. Russ 
Feingold as comparing President George W. Bush to a tyrannical 
monarch). 
2. Texas v. United States, No. CIV. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *1, *62 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). Interestingly, the case was brought by twenty-
six states rather than by a representative of the legislative branch. Id. at *1. 
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Congress and “not just rewriting the laws [but] . . . creating them from 
scratch.”3 
It is both the present salience and the enduring importance of the 
issue of executive discretion that inspired this Symposium, which brings 
together respected scholars in the fields of law and political science to 
consider the role and limits of executive discretion in the administrative 
state. Some of these scholars have taken a historical perspective, 
demonstrating that the problem of executive power has been, and 
remains, a central and perennial one in American democracy. Moreover, 
the Articles in this Symposium confirm that facile characterizations of 
one party’s or even one administration’s approach to the issue of 
executive power fall woefully short of providing any descriptive power. 
Instead, the story of executive discretion and its limits throughout 
American history is a nuanced one, in which raw political imperatives 
as well as high constitutional theory, informal norms, and long-term 
rule-of-law considerations have all played a role. 
One theme that weaves through many of the papers in this 
Symposium is the importance of informal political constraints on Pres-
idential power. For example, Dino P. Christenson, Assistant Professor 
of Political Science at Boston University, and Douglas L. Kriner, 
Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University, flip the 
conventional line of questioning on its head, and instead of asking why 
Presidents seem to be acting unilaterally with greater and greater 
frequency, they ask why Presidents do not do so more often, given the 
relative lack of formal legal constraints on unilateral executive action.4 
The answer, it turns out, is that informal political constraints play an 
important—if not predominant—role in shaping Presidential decision-
making. Using the case study of President Obama’s executive action on 
immigration before the 2012 presidential election and his delay in acting 
in advance of the 2014 midterms, Christenson and Kriner demonstrate 
that the President acted unilaterally only when “the electoral benefits 
of acting . . . outweighed the anticipated political costs of doing so.”5 
Similarly, they demonstrate that President Obama’s decision to seek 
congressional authorization before taking military action in Syria was 
motivated by political rather than legal concerns. 
Joseph White, Luxemberg Family Professor of Public Policy and 
Chair of the Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve 
University, examines a more unusual occurrence: Congress handing 
 
3. Id. at *50. 
4. Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political Constraints on Uni-
lateral Executive Action, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 897 (2015). 
5. Id. at 920. 
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power back to the President to exercise according to his own prerog-
atives—specifically, by eliminating earmarks.6 The elimination of 
congressional earmarks may profitably be viewed as an instance of 
shifting power more than of streamlining the legislative process, be-
cause, as Professor White explains, “the issue is not whether there will 
be programs with local benefits. The issue is who will decide which 
localities benefit”—the President or Congress.7 Yet, just as Christenson 
and Kriner found that informal checks drive executive self-restraint, 
White attributes congressional self-restraint primarily to political 
norms and the pressures of public opinion. The increasing visibility of 
earmarks, combined with public distrust of legislators and the 
legislative process, has led to a legislative reform that has turned out 
to be both impactful and difficult to undo, if also largely counter-
productive. 
Zachary Price, Associate Professor at University of California 
Hastings College of Law, places his focus on informal political 
constraints on presidential inaction. In particular, Professor Price asks 
how strong the norm of executive enforcement duty should be. He 
concludes that it should be relatively robust, since citizens of all stripes 
have an interest in ensuring that legislative achievements retain lasting 
force beyond the administration in which they are enacted. In addition, 
Professor Price contends that transparency, centralization, and 
definiteness—though arguably desirable in most administrative 
contexts—are detrimental to ensuring fidelity to statutory commands 
in the agency enforcement context. Thus, both Price’s and White’s 
contributions show that the nation’s long-term interest is not always 
well-served when short-term concerns motivate the political branches 
to take actions affecting the distribution of power between them. 
Finally, Neal Devins, the Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor 
of Government at the College of William and Mary, explores congress-
ional oversight of the executive from yet another angle: congressional 
participation in litigation as amicus curiae.8 In particular, he carefully 
documents Congress’s transition from acting in a bipartisan manner to 
protect institutional prerogatives against executive encroachment 
during the 1970s and 1980s to asserting itself in more partisan ways 
over the past decade, primarily by filing single-party amicus briefs in 
litigation centering on social issues. Indeed, as Devins demonstrates, 
 
6. Joseph White, Jimmy Carter and James Miller’s Revenge: The Reasons 
and the Consequences for Presidential and Congressional Power of 
Measures to Ban Congressional “Earmarks,” 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
1175 (2015). 
7. Id. at 1182. 
8. Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from 
Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
933 (2015). 
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the bipartisan brief in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, argued in the Supreme 
Court’s 2014 Term, is the “exception that proves the rule”: lawmakers 
from both parties came together to file a brief supporting Congress’s 
power to declare that parents whose children are born in Jerusalem 
should be entitled to list Israel on the child’s passport in the face of a 
State Department policy requiring the birthplace to be listed only as 
“Jerusalem.”9 In that case, however, as Devins explains, the unifying 
factor was most likely support for Israel, which both parties wished to 
emphasize, rather than the power of Congress vis-à-vis the executive. 
Thus, Devins’s article, too, supports the notion that party politics, 
mostly of the short-term variety, drive important decisions in the 
separation-of-powers realm. 
Two of the contributions to this Symposium view the issue of 
executive power and its constraints in long-term historical perspective. 
Jonathan Entin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and David L. 
Brennan Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, traces the 
fascinating history of Myers v. United States,10 which he has shown to 
be “a most curious case.”11 Demonstrating in concrete and colorful 
detail the persistence of debates over executive power in the domestic 
realm throughout American history, Dean Entin’s article analyzes 
several of the fascinating puzzles presented by the Myers case. First, 
why did the case come into existence at all? Second, why was it written 
so expansively? And third, what is its true legacy? These questions 
seem particularly pertinent in light of the relative insignificance (or at 
least the unknown significance) of the employment dispute underlying 
it. Ultimately, it seems that here, as elsewhere, pragmatic political 
considerations overlapped with more perennial constitutional and 
policy concerns, creating precedent of continuing if at times uncertain 
importance. 
In addition, Peter Strauss, Betts Professor of Law at Columbia 
University, places two important recent works on the American Presi-
dency into dialogue with each other: Harold Bruff’s Untrodden Ground: 
How Presidents Interpret the Constitution and Heidi Kitrosser’s 
Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Executive Power, and the 
U.S. Constitution.12 Both works attempt to make sense of the 
 
9. Id. at 953–55; see generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 
725 F.3d 197, 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. Zivotofsky 
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014). 
10. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
11. Jonathan L. Entin, The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster: Myers 
v. United States, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1059 (2015). 
12. Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 1151 (2015) (citing Harold Bruff, Untrodden Ground: 
How Presidents Interpret the Constitution (2015), and Heidi 
Kitrosser, Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, 
Executive Power, and the U.S. Constitution (2015)). 
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relationship among Presidents, politics, and constitutional interpreta-
tion. The former book is focused on the “unmediated” Presidency—
those domains in which the President can act alone—whereas the latter 
is focused on the “mediated” Presidency—those areas in which the 
President acts through administrative agencies. Thoughtfully reviewing 
the different approaches each work takes, Professor Strauss comes to 
the conclusion that Presidents’ attitudes toward the Constitution, 
which determines the likelihood of preserving an effective but 
accountable executive, depend upon a constellation of formal and in-
formal legal norms as well as individual personalities and experiences. 
Ultimately, despite the significant changes that the country has 
undergone since the Founding, Professor Bruff’s optimistic conclusion, 
quoted in Professor Strauss’s review, seems apt: “Overall, the 
presidential office in the hands of its occupants has evolved in ways 
that seem sufficient to protect both the nation and the rule of law.”13 
Finally, reminding us that hard legal constraints matter as well, 
two of the Articles in this Symposium focus specifically on legal control 
of executive authority. First, Susan Dudley, Director of the George 
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center and Research 
Professor at the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public 
Administration at George Washington University, concisely but 
thoroughly reviews recent efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, to 
reform the regulatory process.14 Noting the large array of tools available 
for encouraging efficiency and accountability within administrative 
agencies, particularly by the judicial and legislative branches, she ends 
on a hopeful note, suggesting that the momentum is growing for 
concrete and meaningful change. 
Turning to a less widely examined area of executive discretion, 
Harold Krent, Dean and Professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
analyzes the legal and constitutional constraints on presidential control 
over agency adjudication.15 Krent first reviews well-known precedent 
suggesting that the President’s appointment and removal authority 
may be limited to a greater extent with respect to officials engaged in 
judicial functions than with respect to other agency officials. He then 
turns to the thorny but intriguing question whether the President’s 
managerial control over such judicial officers is similarly limited. Krent 
seeks to balance the conflicting imperatives to respect the important 
policymaking function of agency adjudication and to protect judicial 
independence, along with the rights of individuals challenging agency 
action. Thus, he concludes that administrative adjudicators can and 
should be insulated from control over, or punishment for, the content 
 
13. Id. at 1159. 
14. Susan E. Dudley, Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons from the 
Past and Prospects for the Future, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1027 (2015). 
15. Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the 
Executive Branch, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1083 (2015). 
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of their decisions, though the executive may exercise other kinds of 
managerial control over them.  
Taken together, these articles span a wide array of questions 
concerning executive power and its limits. They bring nuance and 
historical perspective to an issue that is too often disposed of through 
superficial snap judgments. And they make an important contribution 
to a significant debate that is sure to endure at least into the next two 
centuries of our constitutional democracy, just as it has preoccupied 
the first two. 
 
